The world economy is now more integrated and states are now more interdependent than ever before. New institutions have been created over the past three decades with the aim of promoting global political and economic stability the world over.
In this essay I will illustrate how international organisations have helped enhance interaction between states by playing a subtle but vital role.I will do this by first defining international organizations with reference to the regime theory, followed by a discussion on work put forward by Lisa Miller and then compare it with the view propagated by Kenneth Abbot who takes a slightly different approach to international organization.
The regime theory, which was put forward by the liberal tradition, argued that international institutions or regimes affected the behaviour of states. It assumed cooperation was possible in an anarchic system of states. Regimes can be defined as ‘a set of explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area’ (Krasner, 1983) . I will refer to these regimes as international organizations from now on. Regime theory is crucial in understanding the importance of the effect international organizations have on state behaviour. I will now put forward different theories which will demonstrate the importance of international organizations today.
In order for states to cooperate they must overcome a range of collective action problems which would hinder any kind of economic integration (Keohane, 1984) . As most problems were rooted to external costs, agreements would have to be self-enforced as there was no external enforcement existing at that time. This meant that states would have to avoid the temptation of cheating which would only be possible if they have high quality information available on actions and preferences of other states as well as the consequences of cheating on agreements (Keohane, 1984) . International organisations can provide the essential monitoring facility to ensure that all states keep to their commitments and alert other nations if states have cheated. It can also be used as a platform for negotiating agreements and resolving disputes, and to learn about other nation’s preferences and constraints first hand. (Martin, 2007) . By providing these functions International Organisation become a valuable foundation for international cooperation.
By taking trade as an example, Lisa Martin explains how international organisations enhance cooperation by creating a structure for states to negotiate and facilitate international bargaining by setting up mechanisms that encourage states to meet their agreements. (Martin, 2007) . The World Trade Organisation, for example, does this by actively promoting trade liberalization amongst its members who then negotiate and bargain using the same framework. Additionally, negotiations do not alter the terms of trade (ratio of exports to imports). If this was not the case, some parties trade balances would worsen and they would become reluctant to accept such negotiations (Martin, 2007) . Institutions also reduce the cost of agreements and transaction costs, for example, in each General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) round many procedural problems are solved and do not have to be revisited allowing for greater progress in future rounds. With each success it creates confidence and belief amongst members that interaction will continue for the foreseeable future increasing the institutions reputation which encourage more members and allows for more complex agreements to be undertaken (Keohane, 1984) .
The second role for international organisations is enforcement by providing information to its members concerning whether other states are meeting their commitments. They do this with the help of private actors. For example, exporters who are having trouble selling abroad would have an incentive to uncover violations and report them. In other agreements, such as arms controls, private actors would have less of a role. Such agreements would include provisions for government monitoring but, as governments could find ways to work around this, trade organisations would often use enhanced monitoring checks to review member practices. (Martin, 2007) . Such monitoring facilities give members a sense of confidence that other members will not cheat thus enhancing cooperation. The mechanisms used, although not completely efficient, are moving in the right direction (Martin, 2007) . The system is becoming more institutionalized and legalized which in turns promotes an environment where states can actively interact with confidence and sign agreements with each other on social, political or economic levels as the frameworks allows states to remain focused on their agendas while feeling secure that the other party will live up to their commitments (Martin, 2007) . Such an environment leads to increasing cooperation amongst states as they become more interdependent. The best example would be the European Union which originated from an economic agreement of coal and steel between France and Germany. It has now become a fully functional institution of 27 countries that have several economic and political agreements in place. Through the enforcement of rules and regulations, international organisations are able to achieve objectives they would not be able achieve otherwise; states would not have been able to cooperate without the functions that the organisations provide. International organisations extend the scope of their roles by developing a common set of norms and practices that define states or even redefine them. (Abbot, 1998)
Another dimension from which to consider the effectiveness of international organisations is through the ‘principal-agent’ approach. This theory states that more powerful nations use international organisations as agents for their own global interests. Such an agenda damages the credibility of international organisations. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have forever been criticised for spreading US interests (Martin, 2007) . Although IMF does have some autonomy, those members that contribute most to their funds are given more votes that enable them to influence its decisions; in the IMF’s case the United States is the majority vote holder. The IMF’s ‘structural adjustment plans’, which are enforced in return for loans, are accused of being pro-western and encouraging liberalization of trade and finance in economies which are not suited to such policy making and, at times, have in fact worsened the economic situation. Scholars claim that majority holders frequently intervene to promote leniency towards favoured states which effects the implementation of IMF policies which are enforced without any sort of consistency only to damage its reputation. (Martin, 2007) . Despite this, neoliberal scholars claim that international organisation can be autonomous in their policymaking, especially in areas of technical expertise such as financial, health and environmental issues where governments would not know on what grounds to intervene (Martin, 2007) .
Kennith Abbot also felt that international organisations helped promote cooperation but he had a slightly different approach from Lisa Millers work (Abbot, 1998) . He explained that international organisation have two main structures that influenced their functions: centralization (a stable organisation structure and administrative team managing collective activities) and independence (authority to act with a degree of autonomy and often with neutrality) (Abbot, 1998) . Such functions enhance the efficiency of international organisations allowing for greater interaction amongst states. I will now break down these two structures to emphasize their importance to states.
Centralization effects direct state interaction and the organization’s own operational activities. (Abbot, 1998) . Established organisations that have this structure in place create a stable negotiating forum which allows for a fast response to new and changing issues (Abbot, 1998) . An example of this is the UN Security Council. For it to operate effectively under short notice, representatives of states must be based at the UN headquarters at all times to allow for a quick response to new developments. Permanent organisations can reinforce norms that were previously agreed upon such as the ‘most favoured nation principle’ put forward by the WTO. Once agreed upon, negotiations can move forward and more complex agreements can be undertaken. Direct state interaction allows international organisations to be more efficient as negotiations between states are pushed forward allowing for greater interaction between states (Abbot, 1998) . Lisa Miller also pointed this out, as mentioned earlier in this essay. Alongside this, international organisations provide support in managing vast amounts of operational activities. The World Bank is an example of an operational organisation which manages massive development projects worldwide. They provide technical assistance and training in many disciples as well producing wide ranging information through research and publications. Such organizations have huge budgets and bureaucracies allowing for greater autonomy in its work (Abbot, 1998) . These organizations can significantly influence state interests, capabilities and understandings. This often creates certain norms and practices among states (Abbot, 1998) which can be beneficial and, if all states are using the same framework, agreements would be easier to form.
The second structure of international organizations is independence. Centralization requires operational autonomy but, more powerful and effective international organizations require considerable independence in their activities (Abbot, 1998) . If an international organization can act as a neutral and independent actor, it can effectively transform relations amongst states which would enhance its efficiency, legitimacy and reputation when acting on collective or individual state issues. (Abbot, 1998) .
As I did with centralization, I will now explain how independence effects direct state intervention and the operations of those organizations that use this structure. Independent international organizations can promote cooperation between states in more proactive ways then as discussed with centralization (Abbot, 1998) . Governing bodies for states are often authorized to call upon member states to consider current problems. Along with this, personnel can also influence negotiation agendas (Abbot, 1998) . For example the UN Secretary-General may put forward any issue to the Security Council which, in his view, is a threat to world peace. On a more technical level, personnel can at times provide support by suggesting linkages or trade-offs during negotiation rounds at the WTO and push negotiations forward by breaking possible stalemate issues (Abbot, 1998) . Such independence allows for more views and issues to be taken into account as well as some issues which may have been previously ignored if there was no independent voice. International organization, by providing independent support, facilitate better cooperation by pushing negotiations forward and providing better results (Abbot, 1998) . Conversely, if such a role had been played by a dominant state, it would be prove to be suspicious and states may not cooperate as willingly. International organizations, if independent, have the ability to promote activities and agreements which may not have been possible if states interacted directly. States would be reluctant to accept assistant from other states as it may seem to be an attempt to gain political influence. Similarly, states are reluctant to accept help from former colonial powers for the same reason. Institutions such as the World Bank and IMF have a reputation for being relatively independent and can provide independent development assistance. Hence, this allows states to receive aid without more dominant powers directly exerting their influence (Abbot, 1998) . Finally, neutrality allows international organisations to remain impartial and mediate amongst states when negotiations are in a deadlock or disputes have occurred. Neutrality is important in several activities that international organizations conduct such as providing information or playing the role of an arbitrator. By being neutral, resolutions are seen to be fair as there were no national biases involved. Similarly, information may also be seen as more reliable (Abbot, 1998) . The independence function allows international organizations to be more proactive allowing for greater cooperation among states.
As I have discussed, international organisations have a substantial effect on relations amongst states. They provide a place where states can negotiate and learn about each other needs while playing the role of the enforcer. They ensure that states do not cheat on their agreements, allowing for greater confidence amongst states and more complex and substantive resolutions to be undertaken. Centralized and independent organizations are more efficient: by having a permanent home and proper framework they allows for proactive discussions, while the independent aspect has the effect of making information provided more reliable and, when it plays the role of arbiter or provides financial aid, it is not seen with suspicion. Such organisation allow for greater negotiations amongst states as well resolving possible disputes and conflicts between states while remaining neutral on the matter. Some international organization may be seen as agent of more powerful nations while still keeping relative autonomy. However, despite such criticisms, international organisations have not been abandoned demonstrating the belief in their importance and future potential. (Abbot, 1998) .
In conclusion, international organizations actively promote cooperation and can push forward agreements between states which would otherwise not been possible. International organizations promote confidence and reduce suspicion allowing for greater cooperation and interdependence and reducing the potential for conflict.
Bibliography
Abbot, K. W. (1998). Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations. The Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol 42 , 3-32.
Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press.
Krasner, S. (1983). Structural Causes and Regime Conequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables''. New York: Cornell University Press.
Martin, L. (2007). Neoliberalism. In International Relations Theory. Discipline and Diversity (pp. 109-126). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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